We introduce a new algorithm for the numerical computation of Nash equilibria of competitive two-player games. Our method is a natural generalization of gradient descent to the two-player setting where the update is given by the Nash equilibrium of a regularized bilinear local approximation of the underlying game. It avoids oscillatory and divergent behaviors seen in alternating gradient descent. Using numerical experiments and rigorous analysis, we provide a detailed comparison to methods based on \emph{optimism} and \emph{consensus} and show that our method avoids making any unnecessary changes to the gradient dynamics while achieving exponential (local) convergence for (locally) convex-concave zero sum games. Convergence and stability properties of our method are robust to strong interactions between the players, without adapting the stepsize, which is not the case with previous methods. In our numerical experiments on non-convex-concave problems, existing methods are prone to divergence and instability due to their sensitivity to interactions among the players, whereas we never observe divergence of our algorithm. The ability to choose larger stepsizes furthermore allows our algorithm to achieve faster convergence, as measured by the number of model evaluations.

本文提出了一种用于计算竞争性双人游戏纳什均衡的新算法，该算法基于正则化双线性局部逼近的纳什均衡，避免了交替梯度下降中出现的振荡和发散，而且在达到指数级(局部)收敛性的同时，其收敛和稳定性的性质对于玩家之间的强交互是稳健的，具有更快的收敛速度。

竞争性梯度下降