The fundamental assignment problem is in search of welfare maximization mechanisms to allocate items to agents when the private preferences over indivisible items are provided by self-interested agents. The mainstream mechanism \textit{Random Priority} is asymptotically the best mechanism for this purpose, when comparing its welfare to the optimal social welfare using the canonical \textit{worst-case approximation ratio}. Despite its popularity, the efficiency loss indicated by the worst-case ratio does not have a constant bound. Recently, [Deng, Gao, Zhang 2017] show that when the agents' preferences are drawn from a uniform distribution, its \textit{average-case approximation ratio} is upper bounded by 3.718. They left it as an open question of whether a constant ratio holds for general scenarios. In this paper, we offer an affirmative answer to this question by showing that the ratio is bounded by $1/\mu$ when the preference values are independent and identically distributed random variables, where $\mu$ is the expectation of the value distribution. This upper bound also improves the upper bound of 3.718 in [Deng, Gao, Zhang 2017] for the Uniform distribution. Moreover, under mild conditions, the ratio has a \textit{constant} bound for any independent random values. En route to these results, we develop powerful tools to show the insights that in most instances the efficiency loss is small.

本文研究了基本的分配问题，提出了一种新的机制来最大化效益，即当提供自利智能体对不可分割项目的私人偏好时，我们提出了一种新的机制：随机优先级机制，并且发现这种机制的效率损失具有常数界 。

具有独立偏好的分配问题的平均情况分析