The concrete efficiency of secure computation has been the focus of many recent works. In this work, we present concretely-efficient protocols for secure $3$-party computation (3PC) over a ring of integers modulo $2^{\ell}$ tolerating one corruption, both with semi-honest and malicious security. Owing to the fact that computation over ring emulates computation over the real-world system architectures, secure computation over ring has gained momentum of late. Cast in the offline-online paradigm, our constructions present the most efficient online phase in concrete terms. In the semi-honest setting, our protocol requires communication of $2$ ring elements per multiplication gate during the {\it online} phase, attaining a per-party cost of {\em less than one element}. This is achieved for the first time in the regime of 3PC. In the {\it malicious} setting, our protocol requires communication of $4$ elements per multiplication gate during the online phase, beating the state-of-the-art protocol by $5$ elements. Realized with both the security notions of selective abort and fairness, the malicious protocol with fairness involves slightly more communication than its counterpart with abort security for the output gates {\em alone}. We apply our techniques from $3$PC in the regime of secure server-aided machine-learning (ML) inference for a range of prediction functions-- linear regression, linear SVM regression, logistic regression, and linear SVM classification. Our setting considers a model-owner with trained model parameters and a client with a query, with the latter willing to learn the prediction of her query based on the model parameters of the former. The inputs and computation are outsourced to a set of three non-colluding servers. Our constructions catering to both semi-honest and the malicious world, invariably perform better than the existing constructions.

该论文探讨了在模$2^l$的整数环上进行安全计算的问题，提出了具有半诚实和恶意安全性的三方安全计算协议，并将其应用于安全服务器辅助的机器学习推理中，性能表现较好。

ASTRA: 高吞吐量的环上三方计算及其在安全预测中的应用