Recent studies show that private training data can be leaked through the gradients sharing mechanism deployed in distributed machine learning systems, such as federated learning (FL). Increasing batch size to complicate data recovery is often viewed as a promising defense strategy against data leakage. In this paper, we revisit this defense premise and propose an advanced data leakage attack with theoretical justification to efficiently recover batch data from the shared aggregated gradients. We name our proposed method as \textit{\underline{c}atastrophic d\underline{a}ta leakage in vertical \underline{f}ederated l\underline{e}arning} (CAFE). Comparing to existing data leakage attacks, our extensive experimental results on vertical FL settings demonstrate the effectiveness of CAFE to perform large-batch data leakage attack with improved data recovery quality. We also propose a practical countermeasure to mitigate CAFE. Our results suggest that private data participated in standard FL, especially the vertical case, have a high risk of being leaked from the training gradients. Our analysis implies unprecedented and practical data leakage risks in those learning settings. The code of our work is available at \href{https://github.com/DeRafael/CAFE}{\textcolor{blue}{\url{https://github.com/DeRafael/CAFE}}}.

本论文提出一种名为CAFE的先进数据泄露攻击方法，可有效地从共享聚合梯度中恢复批量数据，并指出标准FL中的隐私数据，尤其是竖直情况下，有很高的泄露风险。

CAFE: 垂直联邦学习中的灾难性数据泄露