In the cybersecurity setting, defenders are often at the mercy of their detection technologies and subject to the information and experiences that individual analysts have. In order to give defenders an advantage, it is important to understand an attacker's motivation and their likely next best action. As a first step in modeling this behavior, we introduce a security game framework that simulates interplay between attackers and defenders in a noisy environment, focusing on the factors that drive decision making for attackers and defenders in the variants of the game with full knowledge and observability, knowledge of the parameters but no observability of the state (``partial knowledge''), and zero knowledge or observability (``zero knowledge''). We demonstrate the importance of making the right assumptions about attackers, given significant differences in outcomes. Furthermore, there is a measurable trade-off between false-positives and true-positives in terms of attacker outcomes, suggesting that a more false-positive prone environment may be acceptable under conditions where true-positives are also higher.

为了提高防御者的战术优势，本文通过引入一种安全游戏框架，模拟了攻击者和防御者在各种不同知晓程度和情境下的决策方式，并探究了在真假报警间取得平衡的方法。

噪声安全游戏攻防交互模拟