As machine learning (ML) classifiers increasingly oversee the automated monitoring of network traffic, studying their resilience against adversarial attacks becomes critical. This paper focuses on poisoning attacks, specifically backdoor attacks, against network traffic flow classifiers. We investigate the challenging scenario of clean-label poisoning where the adversary's capabilities are constrained to tampering only with the training data - without the ability to arbitrarily modify the training labels or any other component of the training process. We describe a trigger crafting strategy that leverages model interpretability techniques to generate trigger patterns that are effective even at very low poisoning rates. Finally, we design novel strategies to generate stealthy triggers, including an approach based on generative Bayesian network models, with the goal of minimizing the conspicuousness of the trigger, and thus making detection of an ongoing poisoning campaign more challenging. Our findings provide significant insights into the feasibility of poisoning attacks on network traffic classifiers used in multiple scenarios, including detecting malicious communication and application classification.

本文研究了机器学习分类器在网络流量自动监控中的鲁棒性，关注于网络流量流分类器受到有害攻击的后门攻击，对干净标签毒化的挑战场景进行了调查，并提出了一种触发器制作策略，其中利用模型解释性技术生成有效的触发模式，最终设计了生成贝叶斯网络模型等创新策略以生成隐蔽触发器，以最小化触发器的醒目程度，从而使检测正在进行的侵毒行动更具挑战性。该研究的发现提供了在多种情况下使用的网络流量分类器遭受侵毒攻击的可行性见解，包括检测恶意通信和应用程序分类。

网络流分类器中的毒化攻击