We develop a general and practical framework to address the problem of the optimal design of dynamic fee mechanisms for multiple blockchain resources. Our framework allows to compute policies that optimally trade-off between adjusting resource prices to handle persistent demand shifts versus being robust to local noise in the observed block demand. In the general case with more than one resource, our optimal policies correctly handle cross-effects (complementarity and substitutability) in resource demands. We also show how these cross-effects can be used to inform resource design, i.e. combining resources into bundles that have low demand-side cross-effects can yield simpler and more efficient price-update rules. Our framework is also practical, we demonstrate how it can be used to refine or inform the design of heuristic fee update rules such as EIP-1559 or EIP-4844 with two case studies. We then estimate a uni-dimensional version of our model using real market data from the Ethereum blockchain and empirically compare the performance of our optimal policies to EIP-1559.

通过开发一般且实用的框架，我们解决了多个区块链资源的动态费用机制的最优设计问题。我们的框架允许计算出能在调整资源价格以处理持续需求变化和在观察到的区块需求中具有本地噪声鲁棒性之间进行最优权衡的策略。在存在多个资源的一般情况下，我们的最优策略可以正确处理资源需求中的交叉效应（互补性和替代性）。我们还展示了如何利用这些交叉效应来指导资源设计，即将资源组合成低需求交叉效应的捆绑资源可以获得更简单和更高效的价格更新规则。我们的框架还具有实用性，我们通过两个案例研究展示了如何使用它来完善或指导启发式费用更新规则（如EIP-1559或EIP-4844）。然后，我们使用以太坊区块链的实际市场数据估计了我们模型的一维版本，并实证比较了我们的最优策略与EIP-1559的性能。

区块链资源的最优动态费用