Current Large Language Models (LLMs) are unparalleled in their ability to generate grammatically correct, fluent text. LLMs are appearing rapidly, and debates on LLM capacities have taken off, but reflection is lagging behind. Thus, in this position paper, we first zoom in on the debate and critically assess three points recurring in critiques of LLM capacities: i) that LLMs only parrot statistical patterns in the training data; ii) that LLMs master formal but not functional language competence; and iii) that language learning in LLMs cannot inform human language learning. Drawing on empirical and theoretical arguments, we show that these points need more nuance. Second, we outline a pragmatic perspective on the issue of `real' understanding and intentionality in LLMs. Understanding and intentionality pertain to unobservable mental states we \textit{attribute} to other humans because they have \textit{pragmatic value}: they allow us to abstract away from complex underlying mechanics and predict behaviour effectively. We reflect on the circumstances under which it would make sense for humans to similarly attribute mental states to LLMs, thereby outlining a pragmatic philosophical context for LLMs as an increasingly prominent technology in society.

当前大型语言模型（LLMs）在生成符合语法、流畅的文本方面无与伦比。这篇论文针对LLMs的能力进行了辩论，并通过批判性评估三个经常在批评中出现的观点来展示LLMs仍需更多细化。其次，文章从实证和理论的角度提出了对LLMs中“真正”的理解和意向性的实用观点，并讨论了在何种情况下将心理状态归因于LLMs对于这一日益重要的技术在社会中具有实用的哲学背景。

大型语言模型：当前辩论的细腻需求和实用角度下的理解