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Feb, 2024
非原子拥堵博弈中的最优税收设计学习
Learning Optimal Tax Design in Nonatomic Congestion Games
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Qiwen Cui, Maryam Fazel, Simon S. Du
TL;DR
研究如何学习最优税收设计以最大化无序拥堵博弈中的效率;通过均衡反馈方法来学习最优税收,通过分段线性税收来逼近最优税收,通过边界税收来找到最优解;算法的样本复杂度为O(βF²/ε)。
Abstract
We study how to learn the
optimal tax design
to maximize the efficiency in
nonatomic congestion games
. It is known that self-interested behavior among the players can damage the system's efficiency. Tax mechanism
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