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May, 2024
动态机制设计中的公平分配
Fair Allocation in Dynamic Mechanism Design
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Alireza Fallah, Michael I. Jordan, Annie Ulichney
TL;DR
通过研究动态机制设计问题,我们确定拍卖者在每一轮中向两个买家群体销售一个不可分割的商品的优化分配和付款方式,以最大化他们的折扣总收入并遵守确保每个群体最低平均分配的公平约束。
Abstract
We consider a
dynamic mechanism design
problem where an
auctioneer
sells an indivisible good to two groups of buyers in every round, for a total of $T$ rounds. The
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