Corrigibility of autonomous agents is an under explored part of system design, with previous work focusing on single agent systems. It has been suggested that uncertainty over the human preferences acts to keep the agents corrigible, even in the face of human irrationality. We present a general framework for modelling corrigibility in a multi-agent setting as a 2 player game in which the agents always have a move in which they can ask the human for supervision. This is formulated as a Bayesian game for the purpose of introducing uncertainty over the human beliefs. We further analyse two specific cases. First, a two player corrigibility game, in which we want corrigibility displayed in both agents for both common payoff (monotone) games and harmonic games. Then we investigate an adversary setting, in which one agent is considered to be a `defending' agent and the other an `adversary'. A general result is provided for what belief over the games and human rationality the defending agent is required to have to induce corrigibility.

本研究解决了自主智能体可修正性在多智能体系统设计中的不足，提出了一种将可修正性建模为双人游戏的通用框架，以引入人类信念的不确定性。关键发现表明，通过分析两种特定情况下的游戏设置，确定了防御智能体所需的人类理性信念，以有效促进可修正性的实现。

多智能体游戏中的可修正性与对齐性