The security of computers is at risk because of information leaking through
physical outputs such as power, temperature, or electromagnetic (EM) emissions.
Attackers can use advanced signal measurement and analysis to recover sensitive
data from these sidechannels. To address this problem, this paper presents
Maya, a simple and effective solution against power side-channels. The idea is
to re-shape the power dissipated by an application in an
application-transparent manner using control theory techniques - preventing
attackers from learning any information. With control theory, a controller can
reliably keep power close to a desired target value even when runtime
conditions change unpredictably. Then, by changing these targets intelligently,
power can be made to appear in any desired form, appearing to carry activity
information which, in reality, is unrelated to the application. Maya can be
implemented in privileged software or in simple hardware. In this paper, we
implement Maya on two multiprocessor machines using Operating System (OS)
threads, and show its effectiveness and ease of deployment.

Maya 提出了一个简单而有效的解决能源侧信道攻击的方法，通过控制理论技术重新塑造应用程序所消耗的能量，防止攻击者获取敏感数据，可在特权软件或简单硬件中实现。