The Paris Agreement, considered a significant milestone in climate
negotiations, has faced challenges in effectively addressing climate change due
to the unconditional nature of most Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs).
This has resulted in a prevalence of free-riding behavior among major polluters
and a lack of concrete conditionality in NDCs. To address this issue, we
propose the implementation of a decentralized, bottom-up approach called the
Conditional Commitment Mechanism. This mechanism, inspired by the National
Popular Vote Interstate Compact, offers flexibility and incentives for early
adopters, aiming to formalize conditional cooperation in international climate
policy. In this paper, we provide an overview of the mechanism, its performance
in the AI4ClimateCooperation challenge, and discuss potential real-world
implementation aspects. Prior knowledge of the climate mitigation collective
action problem, basic economic principles, and game theory concepts are
assumed.

通过提出一种去中心化的、自下而上的机制，即条件性承诺机制，来解决气候变化协议中无条件自主贡献的问题，以此促使国际气候政策中的有条件合作。该机制灵感来源于国家普选投票垂直协议，通过提供灵活性和激励措施来实现早期采纳者，旨在规范国际气候政策中的条件合作。本文概述了该机制、其在 AI4ClimateCooperation 挑战中的表现，并讨论了潜在的实际实施方面。前提是对气候减缓集体行动问题、基本经济原理和博弈论概念具有一定的了解。