Consider n individuals who, by popular vote, choose among q >= 2
alternatives, one of which is "better" than the others. Assume that each
individual votes independently at random, and that the probability of voting
for the better alternative is larger than the probability of voting for any
other. It follows from the law of large numbers that a plurality vote among the
n individuals would result in the correct outcome, with probability approaching
one exponentially quickly as n tends to infinity. Our interest in this paper is
in a variant of the process above where, after forming their initial opinions,
the voters update their decisions based on some interaction with their
neighbors in a social network. Our main example is "majority dynamics", in
which each voter adopts the most popular opinion among its friends. The
interaction repeats for some number of rounds and is then followed by a
population-wide plurality vote.
The question we tackle is that of "efficient aggregation of information": in
which cases is the better alternative chosen with probability approaching one
as n tends to infinity? Conversely, for which sequences of growing graphs does
aggregation fail, so that the wrong alternative gets chosen with probability
bounded away from zero? We construct a family of examples in which interaction
prevents efficient aggregation of information, and give a condition on the
social network which ensures that aggregation occurs. For the case of majority
dynamics we also investigate the question of unanimity in the limit. In
particular, if the voters' social network is an expander graph, we show that if
the initial population is sufficiently biased towards a particular alternative
then that alternative will eventually become the unanimous preference of the
entire population.

研究了社交网络上的多数决策问题，在形成初步决策后，考虑交互作用对决策的影响，并探讨在不同的社交网络条件下，少数服从多数的情况是否成立以及信息聚合是否有效。