Aristotle's discussions on modal syllogistic have often been viewed as
error-prone and have garnered significant attention in the literature due to
historical and philosophical interests. However, from a contemporary
standpoint, they also introduced natural fragments of first-order modal logic,
warranting a comprehensive technical analysis. In this paper, drawing
inspiration from the natural logic program, we propose and examine several
variants of modal syllogistic within the epistemic context, thereby coining the
term Epistemic Syllogistic. Specifically, we concentrate on the de re
interpretation of epistemic syllogisms containing non-trivial yet natural
expressions such as "all things known to be A are also known to be not B." We
explore the epistemic apodeictic syllogistic and its extensions, which
accommodate more complex terms. Our main contributions include several
axiomatizations of these logics, with completeness proofs that may be of
independent interest.

本文介绍了新概念的偏见逻辑（Epistemic Syllogistic），并探讨了包含非平凡但自然表达式的认识偏见演绎法。作者还在本文中提出了这些逻辑的多个定理化，并证明了其完整性。