I study a game of strategic exploration with private payoffs and public
actions in a Bayesian bandit setting. In particular, I look at cascade
equilibria, in which agents switch over time from the risky action to the
riskless action only when they become sufficiently pessimistic. I show that
these equilibria exist under some conditions and establish their salient
properties. Individual exploration in these equilibria can be more or less than
the single-agent level depending on whether the agents start out with a common
prior or not, but the most optimistic agent always underexplores. I also show
that allowing the agents to write enforceable ex-ante contracts will lead to
the most ex-ante optimistic agent to buy all payoff streams, providing an
explanation to the buying out of smaller start-ups by more established firms.

本文研究了一种带私人回报和公共行动的策略探索游戏，特别关注级联均衡，在这种均衡中，代理人会随着时间的推移从风险动作转换为无风险动作，仅当他们变得足够悲观。我们证明了在某些条件下这些均衡存在，并确定了它们的显著性质，同时研究了让代理人书写可执行的前期合同，从而提供了一个解释为什么更成熟的公司收购较小初创公司的收益流的方式。