In this paper, we expand on our previous research of the potential for abuse
of generative language models by assessing GPT-3. Experimenting with prompts
representative of different types of extremist narrative, structures of social
interaction, and radical ideologies, we find that GPT-3 demonstrates
significant improvement over its predecessor, GPT-2, in generating extremist
texts. We also show GPT-3's strength in generating text that accurately
emulates interactive, informational, and influential content that could be
utilized for radicalizing individuals into violent far-right extremist
ideologies and behaviors. While OpenAI's preventative measures are strong, the
possibility of unregulated copycat technology represents significant risk for
large-scale online radicalization and recruitment; thus, in the absence of
safeguards, successful and efficient weaponization that requires little
experimentation is likely. AI stakeholders, the policymaking community, and
governments should begin investing as soon as possible in building social
norms, public policy, and educational initiatives to preempt an influx of
machine-generated disinformation and propaganda. Mitigation will require
effective policy and partnerships across industry, government, and civil
society.

本文评估了 GPT-3 在生成极端主义文本方面的潜在滥用可能性，表明其在生成极端主义文本方面比之前的 GPT-2 取得了显着进展，并呼吁 AI 利益相关者、决策制定机构和政府采取措施来避免大规模的在线激进化和招募风险，并建立社会规范、公共政策和教育计划，以预防机器生成的谣言和宣传。