A system responding to a stochastic driving signal can be interpreted as
computing, by means of its dynamics, an implicit model of the environmental
variables. The system's state retains information about past environmental
fluctuations, and a fraction of this information is predictive of future ones.
The remaining nonpredictive information reflects model complexity that does not
improve predictive power, and thus represents the ineffectiveness of the model.
We expose the fundamental equivalence between this model inefficiency and
thermodynamic inefficiency, measured by dissipation. Our results hold
arbitrarily far from thermodynamic equilibrium and are applicable to a wide
range of systems, including biomolecular machines. They highlight a profound
connection between the effective use of information and efficient thermodynamic
operation: any system constructed to keep memory about its environment and to
operate with maximal energetic efficiency has to be predictive.

研究表明，系统动力学响应随机信号的过程可以被解释为其计算环境变量的隐含模型；而模型的效率可以用熵来衡量，因此该研究揭示了信息使用的效率与热力学操作的关联。

预测的热力学

The thermodynamics of prediction

We study the inefficiency of equilibria for various classes of games when
players are (partially) altruistic. We model altruistic behavior by assuming
that player i's perceived cost is a convex combination of 1-\alpha_i times his
direct cost and \alpha_i times the social cost. Tuning the parameters \alpha_i
allows smooth interpolation between purely selfish and purely altruistic
behavior. Within this framework, we study altruistic extensions of linear
congestion games, fair cost-sharing games and valid utility games.
We derive (tight) bounds on the price of anarchy of these games for several
solution concepts. Thereto, we suitably adapt the smoothness notion introduced
by Roughgarden and show that it captures the essential properties to determine
the robust price of anarchy of these games. Our bounds show that for congestion
games and cost-sharing games, the worst-case robust price of anarchy increases
with increasing altruism, while for valid utility games, it remains constant
and is not affected by altruism. However, the increase in the price of anarchy
is not a universal phenomenon: for symmetric singleton linear congestion games,
we derive a bound on the pure price of anarchy that decreases as the level of
altruism increases. Since the bound is also strictly lower than the robust
price of anarchy, it exhibits a natural example in which Nash equilibria are
more efficient than more permissive notions of equilibrium.

本文研究了各种类型的博弈中当玩家是（部分）利他主义者时的均衡的低效性，并通过模拟玩家的 “利他” 行为来推导出这些游戏的安定价格的（严格）下限。