Belief revision and update, two significant types of belief change, both
focus on how an agent modify her beliefs in presence of new information. The
most striking difference between them is that the former studies the change of
beliefs in a static world while the latter concentrates on a
dynamically-changing world. The famous AGM and KM postulates were proposed to
capture rational belief revision and update, respectively. However, both of
them are too permissive to exclude some unreasonable changes in the iteration.
In response to this weakness, the DP postulates and its extensions for iterated
belief revision were presented. Furthermore, Rodrigues integrated these
postulates in belief update. Unfortunately, his approach does not meet the
basic requirement of iterated belief update. This paper is intended to solve
this problem of Rodrigues's approach. Firstly, we present a modification of the
original KM postulates based on belief states. Subsequently, we migrate several
well-known postulates for iterated belief revision to iterated belief update.
Moreover, we provide the exact semantic characterizations based on partial
preorders for each of the proposed postulates. Finally, we analyze the
compatibility between the above iterated postulates and the KM postulates for
belief update.

通过基于信念状态的 KM 经典公设修改以及将经典迭代信念修订的若干公设移植到迭代信念更新中，本文提出了解决 Rodrigues 方法不满足迭代信念更新基本要求的方法，并根据偏序关系提供了每个提出的公设的确切语义特征。最后，本文分析了上述迭代公设与信念更新中的 KM 公设之间的兼容性。