Deep learning models have achieved high performance on many tasks, and thus
have been applied to many security-critical scenarios. For example, deep
learning-based face recognition systems have been used to authenticate users to
access many security-sensitive applications like payment apps. Such usages of
deep learning systems provide the adversaries with sufficient incentives to
perform attacks against these systems for their adversarial purposes. In this
work, we consider a new type of attacks, called backdoor attacks, where the
attacker's goal is to create a backdoor into a learning-based authentication
system, so that he can easily circumvent the system by leveraging the backdoor.
Specifically, the adversary aims at creating backdoor instances, so that the
victim learning system will be misled to classify the backdoor instances as a
target label specified by the adversary. In particular, we study backdoor
poisoning attacks, which achieve backdoor attacks using poisoning strategies.
Different from all existing work, our studied poisoning strategies can apply
under a very weak threat model: (1) the adversary has no knowledge of the model
and the training set used by the victim system; (2) the attacker is allowed to
inject only a small amount of poisoning samples; (3) the backdoor key is hard
to notice even by human beings to achieve stealthiness. We conduct evaluation
to demonstrate that a backdoor adversary can inject only around 50 poisoning
samples, while achieving an attack success rate of above 90%. We are also the
first work to show that a data poisoning attack can create physically
implementable backdoors without touching the training process. Our work
demonstrates that backdoor poisoning attacks pose real threats to a learning
system, and thus highlights the importance of further investigation and
proposing defense strategies against them.

该论文研究了基于深度学习的认证系统对于后门攻击的脆弱性，特别是通过数据注入的后门攻击，通过注入极少的毒数据，攻击者可以成功实现攻击，进而窃取敏感信息，从而为后续研究防御策略提供了研究价值。