Most of the synthesis literature has focused on studying how to synthesize a
strategy to fulfill a task. This task is a duty for the agent. In this paper,
we argue that intelligent agents should also be equipped with rights, that is,
tasks that the agent itself can choose to fulfill (e.g., the right of
recharging the battery). The agent should be able to maintain these rights
while acting for its duties. We study this issue in the context of LTLf
synthesis: we give duties and rights in terms of LTLf specifications, and
synthesize a suitable strategy to achieve the duties that can be modified
on-the-fly to achieve also the rights, if the agent chooses to do so. We show
that handling rights does not make synthesis substantially more difficult,
although it requires a more sophisticated solution concept than standard LTLf
synthesis. We also extend our results to the case in which further duties and
rights are given to the agent while already executing.

本文研究了智能代理应该如何配备权利以满足它可以选择执行的任务，并通过 LTLf 合成进行了实现。我们证明了处理权利并不会使合成过程变得更加困难，但需要一个比标准 LTLf 合成更复杂的解决方案概念。

履行职责，保障权益

Act for Your Duties but Maintain Your Rights

Consciousness and intelligence are properties commonly understood as
dependent by folk psychology and society in general. The term artificial
intelligence and the kind of problems that it managed to solve in the recent
years has been shown as an argument to establish that machines experience some
sort of consciousness. Following the analogy of Russell, if a machine is able
to do what a conscious human being does, the likelihood that the machine is
conscious increases. However, the social implications of this analogy are
catastrophic. Concretely, if rights are given to entities that can solve the
kind of problems that a neurotypical person can, does the machine have
potentially more rights that a person that has a disability? For example, the
autistic syndrome disorder spectrum can make a person unable to solve the kind
of problems that a machine solves. We believe that the obvious answer is no, as
problem solving does not imply consciousness. Consequently, we will argue in
this paper how phenomenal consciousness and, at least, computational
intelligence are independent and why machines do not possess phenomenal
consciousness, although they can potentially develop a higher computational
intelligence that human beings. In order to do so, we try to formulate an
objective measure of computational intelligence and study how it presents in
human beings, animals and machines. Analogously, we study phenomenal
consciousness as a dichotomous variable and how it is distributed in humans,
animals and machines. As phenomenal consciousness and computational
intelligence are independent, this fact has critical implications for society
that we also analyze in this work.

本文讨论了意识和智能的关系，提出了计算智能与感知意识是独立的，并将其在人类、动物和机器中的表现作了比较，进而探讨了这一结论对社会的重要影响。