We propose a model of interdependent scheduling games in which each player
controls a set of services that they schedule independently. A player is free
to schedule his own services at any time; however, each of these services only
begins to accrue reward for the player when all predecessor services, which may
or may not be controlled by the same player, have been activated. This model,
where players have interdependent services, is motivated by the problems faced
in planning and coordinating large-scale infrastructures, e.g., restoring
electricity and gas to residents after a natural disaster or providing medical
care in a crisis when different agencies are responsible for the delivery of
staff, equipment, and medicine. We undertake a game-theoretic analysis of this
setting and in particular consider the issues of welfare maximization,
computing best responses, Nash dynamics, and existence and computation of Nash
equilibria.

该论文提出了一个有关互相依赖调度游戏的模型，以解决在规划和协调大规模基础设施方面所面临的问题。通过博弈论分析模型，探讨该模型中的福利最大化、纳什平衡等方面的问题。