E-commerce platforms usually present an ordered list, mixed with several
organic items and an advertisement, in response to each user's page view
request. This list, the outcome of ad auction and allocation processes,
directly impacts the platform's ad revenue and gross merchandise volume (GMV).
Specifically, the ad auction determines which ad is displayed and the
corresponding payment, while the ad allocation decides the display positions of
the advertisement and organic items. The prevalent methods of segregating the
ad auction and allocation into two distinct stages face two problems: 1) Ad
auction does not consider externalities, such as the influence of actual
display position and context on ad Click-Through Rate (CTR); 2) The ad
allocation, which utilizes the auction-winning ad's payment to determine the
display position dynamically, fails to maintain incentive compatibility (IC)
for the advertisement. For instance, in the auction stage employing the
traditional Generalized Second Price (GSP) , even if the winning ad increases
its bid, its payment remains unchanged. This implies that the advertisement
cannot secure a better position and thus loses the opportunity to achieve
higher utility in the subsequent ad allocation stage. Previous research often
focused on one of the two stages, neglecting the two-stage problem, which may
result in suboptimal outcomes...

电子商务平台上的广告拍卖和分配过程对广告收入和总商品交易量有直接影响，存在两个问题：广告拍卖阶段不考虑外部因素（例如实际显示位置和上下文对广告点击率的影响），广告分配阶段无法实现广告的激励兼容性。以往的研究多关注其中一个阶段，忽视了这个两个阶段的问题，从而导致了次优的结果。