We address the question of aggregating the preferences of voters in the
context of participatory budgeting. We scrutinize the voting method currently
used in practice, underline its drawbacks, and introduce a novel scheme
tailored to this setting, which we call "Knapsack Voting". We study its
strategic properties - we show that it is strategy-proof under a natural model
of utility (a dis-utility given by the $\ell_1$ distance between the outcome
and the true preference of the voter), and "partially" strategy-proof under
general additive utilities. We extend Knapsack Voting to more general settings
with revenues, deficits or surpluses, and prove a similar strategy-proofness
result. To further demonstrate the applicability of our scheme, we discuss its
implementation on the digital voting platform that we have deployed in
partnership with the local government bodies in many cities across the nation.
From voting data thus collected, we present empirical evidence that Knapsack
Voting works well in practice.

本文介绍了一种新的投票方案 Knapsack Voting，用于在参与预算的背景下对选民的偏好进行聚合。经过实证研究，该方案在实践中效果良好，并且在自然模型和一般加性效用下具有一定的策略证明性。