Motivated by equilibrium models of labor markets, we develop a formulation of
causal strategic classification in which strategic agents can directly
manipulate their outcomes. As an application, we compare employers that
anticipate the strategic response of a labor force with employers that do not.
We show through a combination of theory and experiment that employers with
performatively optimal hiring policies improve employer reward, labor force
skill level, and in some cases labor force equity. On the other hand, we
demonstrate that performative employers harm labor force utility and fail to
prevent discrimination in other cases.

通过对劳动市场的平衡模型进行研究，我们发展了一种因果战略分类的表述，在这种模型中，战略代理人可以直接操纵他们的结果。作为应用，我们比较了预计劳动力战略反应和不预计劳动力战略反应的雇主。我们通过理论和实验的结合表明，具有表现最优的招聘政策的雇主可以提高雇主回报率、劳动力技能水平，并在某些情况下实现劳动力公平。另一方面，我们证明具有行动表现的雇主会损害劳动力效用，并且在其他情况下无法防止歧视。

反向学习在具有影响力的双边市场中的应用

Learning In Reverse Causal Strategic Environments With Ramifications on  Two Sided Markets

The persistence of racial inequality in the U.S. labor market against a
general backdrop of formal equality of opportunity is a troubling phenomenon
that has significant ramifications on the design of hiring policies. In this
paper, we show that current group disparate outcomes may be immovable even when
hiring decisions are bound by an input-output notion of "individual fairness."
Instead, we construct a dynamic reputational model of the labor market that
illustrates the reinforcing nature of asymmetric outcomes resulting from
groups' divergent accesses to resources and as a result, investment choices. To
address these disparities, we adopt a dual labor market composed of a Temporary
Labor Market (TLM), in which firms' hiring strategies are constrained to ensure
statistical parity of workers granted entry into the pipeline, and a Permanent
Labor Market (PLM), in which firms hire top performers as desired. Individual
worker reputations produce externalities for their group; the corresponding
feedback loop raises the collective reputation of the initially disadvantaged
group via a TLM fairness intervention that need not be permanent. We show that
such a restriction on hiring practices induces an equilibrium that, under
particular market conditions, Pareto-dominates those arising from strategies
that statistically discriminate or employ a "group-blind" criterion. The
enduring nature of equilibria that are both inequitable and Pareto suboptimal
suggests that fairness interventions beyond procedural checks of hiring
decisions will be of critical importance in a world where machines play a
greater role in the employment process.

研究表明，即使在使用 “个体公平” 的招聘方式时，当前的种族失业差距仍然存在于美国劳动力市场中，并且这些差距是由于资源和投资选择的不对称性而产生的，因此，需要采用双重劳动力市场以保证工人获得公平机会。