The generalized second price (GSP) auction has served as the core selling
mechanism for sponsored search ads for over a decade. However, recent trends
expanding the set of allowed ad formats---to include a variety of sizes,
decorations, and other distinguishing features---have raised critical problems
for GSP-based platforms. Alternatives such as the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG)
auction raise different complications because they fundamentally change the way
prices are computed. In this paper we report on our efforts to redesign a
search ad selling system from the ground up in this new context, proposing a
mechanism that optimizes an entire slate of ads globally and computes prices
that achieve properties analogous to those held by GSP in the original, simpler
setting of uniform ads. A careful algorithmic coupling of
allocation-optimization and pricing-computation allows our auction to operate
within the strict timing constraints inherent in real-time ad auctions. We
report performance results of the auction in Yahoo's Gemini Search platform.

该研究报告探讨了随着广告形式的变革，GSP 拍卖架构在计算价格时所遇到的问题，并提出了一种重新设计搜索广告销售系统的机制来解决这些问题。